

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON

United States of America, *ex rel.* Eva
Zemplenyi, M.D., and Eva Zemplenyi,
M.D., individually,

Plaintiffs,

v.

Group Health Cooperative, Group Health
Permanente, Group Health Options, Inc.,
KPS Health Plans, Group Health Northwest,
Michael Lee, M.D., Terrence Clark, O.D.,
John Does 1-20,

Defendants.

No. C-09-0603-RSM

**AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR
VIOLATIONS OF THE FALSE
CLAIMS ACT, FRAUD, UNJUST
ENRICHMENT, AND
WRONGFUL TERMINATION IN
VIOLATION OF PUBLIC POLICY**

INTRODUCTION

1. This is an action against Defendants for damages and civil money penalties, and other monetary relief, under the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3732 (FCA). Plaintiffs also seek damages under the common law theories of fraud, unjust enrichment, and wrongful termination of employment in violation of public policy.

1 2. A person with knowledge of an FCA violation (relator) may bring an action in
2 federal district court on behalf of the United States: a *qui tam* action. The relator in this case is
3 Eva Zempenyi, M.D., who submitted this *qui tam* action for filing under seal on or about April
4 30, 2009. The Court ordered the matter unsealed on July 15, 2009.

5 3. This action arises out of false claims for unnecessary medical services performed
6 by Defendant Group Health Cooperative and its affiliated entities. Beginning in the mid-1990's,
7 Group Health executives and chief physicians devised a scheme to increase Group Health's
8 revenue from Medicare by increasing the number of cataract surgeries in violation of its own and
9 Medicare reimbursement policies. A great number of these surgeries were performed without a
10 showing of medical benefit or necessity. Defendants made numerous false claims in connection
11 with documents submitted to Medicare and its contractors seeking payments based on, or
12 reimbursement for, these unnecessary services. The initial false claims were also later used to
13 support further false claims in the form of periodic data reports and annual bids submitted to
14 Medicare in connection with Group Health's "Medicare Advantage" plans, resulting in
15 fraudulently inflated "capitated" payments from Medicare.

16 4. In furtherance of the false claims, explicit and implicit directives were made by
17 management-level physician chiefs in the ophthalmology and optometric departments and by
18 other executives in Defendants' organization. Through these directives, management
19 communicated to health care providers including Plaintiff Eva Zempenyi, M.D. the
20 organization's plan to increase revenue by performing increasing numbers of cataract surgeries on
21 its patient population without regard for the appropriate care for any individual Group Health
22 patient or member. The directive to do more surgeries was motivated solely by a desire for
23 financial gain, and ignored federal regulations, the independent judgment of physicians, and
24
25
26

1 concerns for patient safety and well-being.

2 5. During one data period, Group Health promoted a 100% increase in cataract
3 surgeries. This increase was grossly disproportionate to the growth of the Group Health patient
4 population generally.

5 6. At the same time that Group Health was promoting inappropriate surgeries, it also
6 shifted otherwise appropriate services and procedures away from Group Health ophthalmologists
7 and toward lesser qualified optometric physicians. This shift was also intended to cause
8 ophthalmologists to perform more lucrative surgical procedures whether or not appropriate. As an
9 additional consequence, Group Health optometric physicians performed medical services beyond
10 the appropriately licensed scope of their practice.

11 7. When documented cases of unwarranted surgical procedures were reported within
12 Group Health to Group Health's Medicare compliance staff, compliance officers recognized that
13 unnecessary cataract surgeries were being performed and that Medicare may have been billed for
14 charges which violated Medicare and Group Health regulations.

15 8. Defendant Michael Lee, M.D., the Chief of Group Heath's ophthalmology
16 department, learned of reports being made of unnecessary surgeries. Rather than stopping these
17 surgeries, Dr. Lee confronted the Medicare compliance officer and demanded to know the identity
18 of the individual who had reported the abuse. He specifically demanded to know whether Dr.
19 Zempenyi had made the report. The Medicare compliance officer feared that Dr. Lee may seek to
20 retaliate against Dr. Zempenyi and she reported her concerns to Dr. Zempenyi. Her concerns
21 proved well founded. After her report of abuse, Dr. Zempenyi faced months of hostility from Dr.
22 Lee and others. She was ultimately constructively discharged and forced to quit her nearly 20-
23 year employment as a physician at Group Health after reporting the scheme.

1 13. Defendant Group Health Cooperative claims to be “a consumer governed non-
2 profit healthcare system”. It claims to be governed by “an independent board of trustees
3 comprised of eleven consumers elected by Group Health’s voting members”. However, in 2008
4 Group Health took in over \$2.76 billion dollars in total revenues, including \$647,409,000 from
5 Medicare.
6

7 14. Defendant Group Health Permanente (GHP) is a corporation under exclusive
8 contract to provide care in Group Health Cooperative-owned or -operated facilities for patients of
9 Group Health Cooperative. GHP works in close coordination with management of Group Health
10 Cooperative. At all relevant times except where mentioned, Dr. Zemplyni was an employee of
11 GHP.
12

13 15. Defendant Group Health Options, Inc., KPS Health Plans and Group Health
14 Northwest were and/or are wholly-owned subsidiaries of Group Health Cooperative. These
15 subsidiaries provide a variety of health care plans for groups and individuals throughout the State
16 of Washington.

17 16. At all relevant times Defendants Group Health Cooperative, GHP, Group Health
18 Options, Inc., KPS Health Plans and Group Health Northwest were and/or continue to be
19 organized under the laws of Washington. They are each based in Seattle, Washington.
20

21 17. Defendant Michael Lee, M.D. is Chief of Ophthalmology for GHP. Dr. Lee has
22 had direct oversight of the work of Dr. Zemplyni, and was directly responsible for her
23 constructive discharge.

24 18. Defendant Terrance Clark, O.D., is an optometric physician. He is the Chief of
25 GHP’s Federal Way clinic. At all relevant times, as part of Defendants’ scheme, Dr. Clark has
26 expanded the scope of his practice to include procedures which exceed the scope of his license.

1 He has been investigated and sanctioned by the Washington State Department of Health for
 2 performing unlicensed surgery or invasive procedures.

3 19. Defendants John Does 1-20 are presently unknown individuals who are directors,
 4 officers and/or other key employees of Group Health Cooperative and/or GHP. At all relevant
 5 times these individuals were involved in creating, advising on and/or issuing directives to increase
 6 Medicare revenues through performing additional medical procedures ostensibly related to the
 7 treatment of cataracts, which are described in more detail below. These individuals were also
 8 involved in creating policies that ultimately led to the submission of false claims described in
 9 detail below.
 10

11 BACKGROUND

12 A. False Claims Act

13 20. The FCA provides, in pertinent part:

14 (a) Any person who (1) knowingly presents, or causes to be
 15 presented, to an officer or employee of the United States
 16 Government or a member of the Armed Forces of the United
 17 States a false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval;
 18 (2) knowingly makes, uses or causes to be made or used, a
 19 false record or statement to get a false or fraudulent claim
 20 paid or approved by the Government; (3) conspires to
 21 defraud the Government by getting a false or fraudulent
 22 claim paid or approved by the Government; ... or (7)
 23 knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a false
 24 record or statement to conceal, avoid, or decrease an
 25 obligation to pay or transmit money or property to the
 26 Government,

* * *

is liable to the United States Government....

(b) For Purposes of this section, the terms "knowing" and
 "knowingly" mean that a person, with respect to information
 (1) has actual knowledge of the information; (2) acts in
 deliberate ignorance of the truth or falsity of the information;

(3) acts in reckless disregard of the truth or falsity of the information, and no proof of specific intent to defraud is required.

31 U.S.C. § 3729.

31 U.S.C. § 3730(h) provides:

Any employee who is discharged, demoted, suspended, threatened, harassed, or in any other manner discriminated against in the terms and conditions of employment by his or her employer because of lawful acts done by the employee on behalf of the employee or others in furtherance of an action under this section, including investigation for, initiation of, testimony for, or assistance in an action filed or to be filed under this section, shall be entitled to all relief necessary to make the employee whole. Such relief shall include reinstatement with the same seniority status such employee would have had but for the discrimination, 2 times the amount of back pay, interest on the back pay, and compensation for any special damages sustained as a result of the discrimination, including litigation costs and reasonable attorneys' fees. An employee may bring an action in the appropriate district court of the United States for the relief provided in this subsection.

B. The Medicare Advantage Program, Bidding and Payments

21. In 1965, Congress enacted Title XVIII of the Social Security Act, known as the Medicare program, to pay for the costs of certain healthcare services. Entitlement to Medicare is based on age, disability or affliction with end-stage renal disease. *See* 42 U.S.C. §§ 426, 426A.

22. The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) is responsible for the administration and supervision of the Medicare program. The Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), formerly known as the Health Care Financing Agency (HCFA), is an agency of HHS and is directly responsible for the administration of the Medicare program.

23. Part A of the Medicare Program authorizes payment for institutional care,

1 including hospital, skilled nursing facility and home health care. *See* 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395c-1395i-
 2 4. Medicare's Supplementary Medical Insurance, Part B, covers physicians' services, outpatient
 3 care, and other services not covered by Part A, including outpatient surgeries and procedures. *See*
 4 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395j-1395w-4. Generally, medical providers offering services under Parts A and B
 5 are paid a reimbursement from CMS for each service rendered to Medicare beneficiaries, in a
 6 "fee-for-service" arrangement.
 7

8 24. With the passage of the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Medicare beneficiaries
 9 were given the option to receive their Medicare benefits through comprehensive health insurance
 10 plans, instead of through the original Medicare Parts A and B. These programs were originally
 11 known as "Medicare+Choice" or "Part C" plans. *See* 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395w-21-1395w-29.
 12 Pursuant to the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003
 13 (Medicare Modernization Act), Medicare+Choice plans were subject to the addition of
 14 prescription drug coverage and became known as "Medicare Advantage" (MA) plans.
 15

16 25. Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs) such as Group Health Cooperative
 17 have long been afforded a special role in delivering services to Medicare beneficiaries. In
 18 1982, HMOs were given the opportunity to provide all necessary medical services for enrolled
 19 beneficiaries in exchange for a per capita or "capitated" payment per patient, then set at 95% of
 20 the fee-for-service costs per capita in the relevant U.S. county. HMOs are now offering various
 21 MA plans including all medical benefits for enrolled member beneficiaries, and other
 22 advertised supplemental benefits. Pursuant to contracts with CMS, organizations offering these
 23 plans are paid by CMS on a capitated basis, typically in a lump sum per member, per month.
 24

25 26. Contrary to the expectation that MA plans would increase competition and help
 26 drive down Medicare spending by increasing efficiencies, actual payment levels are significantly

1 above those for traditional fee-for-service arrangements. It was estimated that in 2009 payments
2 to organizations offering MA plans ("MA organizations" or MAOs) would cost CMS 113% of
3 the cost of providing the same benefits under the traditional fee-for-service system.

4 27. Under a bidding mechanism established by the Medicare Modernization Act, each
5 MAO offering an MA plan now submits to CMS a bid that represents the payment it anticipates
6 for providing all traditional Medicare Part A and B benefits to plan enrollees. The bid contains all
7 the MAO's estimated costs, including administrative expenses, and its profit margin. *See* 42
8 C.F.R. §422.254(b).

10 28. The bid is calculated and submitted in accordance with a "Medicare Advantage
11 Bid Pricing Tool". The Bid Pricing Tool requires cost data from a base period organized
12 according to benefit service categories, including such services as surgical procedures. These
13 data are required to provide a current best estimate of incurred costs on the basis of actual
14 experience. The annualized utilization per thousand enrollees for each of the benefit service
15 categories during the base period must also be included. Utilization, average unit cost, and
16 other measurements, adjustments and assumptions are used to make a projection of the total
17 costs for the forthcoming contract year. This projection is presented to CMS via the Bid
18 Pricing Tool based on input from actuaries employed by MAOs. CMS can only accept an
19 MAO's bid when "[t]he bid amount...equitably reflects the plan's estimated revenue
20 requirements for providing the benefits under that plan..." 42 C.F.R. §422.256(b)(2),
21

23 29. The bid submitted by each plan is compared with a "benchmark" rate that is
24 periodically determined by CMS for each U.S. county. Each plan receives from Medicare a
25 payment rate equal to the benchmark rate if its bid is equal or greater to the benchmark rate, or
26 its bid plus a "rebate" if its bid is less than the benchmark. 42 C.F.R. §422.304. Because

1 benchmarks--intended to incentivize the offering of MA plans in underserved areas--are often
2 set well above what it costs Medicare to provide benefits to similar beneficiaries under the
3 traditional fee-for-service system, MA plan payment rates greatly exceed comparable fee-for-
4 service spending.

5
6 30. Beginning in 2004, CMS began to phase in a system of adjusting the per-patient
7 capitation payments for individual MA plan enrollees based on the CMS Hierarchical Category
8 Condition (CMS-HCC) risk adjustment model. 42 C.F.R. §422.308(c),(e). "Each MA
9 organization must submit to CMS (in accordance with CMS instructions) the data necessary to
10 characterize the context and purposes of each item and service provided to a Medicare enrollee by
11 a provider, supplier, physician, or other practitioner." 42 C.F.R. §422.310(b). Based on these data
12 submissions, CMS evaluates each patient's demographic characteristics, diagnoses, and
13 treatments in inpatient, outpatient and physician settings. Generally, beneficiaries diagnosed with
14 more illnesses and receiving more services would rate a higher capitation payment to their MAO,
15 likely in excess of the benchmark rate.

16
17 31. Due to the nature of the bidding and risk adjustment mechanisms, a number of
18 claims or data submitted reflecting services rendered in one plan year would increase the
19 amount of capitation payments for enrolled beneficiaries in subsequent plan years. A
20 substantial number of false claims would dramatically increase the capitation payments.

21
22 32. MAOs regard information concerning their bid submissions and capitation
23 payments from CMS as "proprietary", and refuse to make this public funding information
24 available to the public. Surprisingly, CMS generally does not oppose this secrecy and has
25 indicated that it will not disclose MAO bid and payment information in the absence of special
26 requests or court orders.

1 33. The U.S. Government has only recently recognized the potential for false claims
 2 and fraud within the Medicare Advantage capitated payment system. Complaints have recently
 3 been filed by the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of Florida targeting fraud and false
 4 claims perpetrated in connection with MA plans. *See U.S. v. D&A Therapy Center, et al*, Case
 5 No. 08-CV-21954-KMM (S.D. Fla.); *U.S. v. Huarte, et al*, Case No. 09-CR-20523-PAS (S.D.
 6 Fla.)
 7

8 **C. Requirements of Medical Necessity for Surgical Procedures.**

9 34. In addition to other limitations on coverage, Medicare covers only those services
 10 that are “reasonable and necessary for the diagnosis or treatment of illness or injury....” 42 U.S.C.
 11 § 1395y(a)(1)(A). As a condition of their contracts with CMS, all MAOs are expressly required
 12 to adhere to the False Claims Act and other “[f]ederal laws and regulations designed to prevent or
 13 ameliorate fraud, waste, and abuse...” 42 C.F.R. §422.504(h)(1). In turn, MAOs must also ensure
 14 that any agreements delegating responsibilities to contractors and related entities specify that such
 15 contractors and related entities must also comply with all applicable Medicare laws, regulations
 16 and CMS instructions. 42 C.F.R. §422.504(i)(4)(v). The risk adjustment data submitted by
 17 MAOs must “conform to the requirements for equivalent data for Medicare fee-for-service when
 18 appropriate, and to all relevant national standards.” 42 C.F.R. §422.310(d). These data must also
 19 account separately for each physician or other practitioner that would be permitted to bill
 20 separately under the original Medicare program, even if they participate jointly in the same
 21 service. 42 C.F.R. §422.310(c)(2).
 22

24 35. At all times relevant to this action, CMS contracted with Noridian Administrative
 25 Services, LLC (“Noridian”) to administer Medicare claims in the region where Defendants
 26 operate. Pursuant to its contract and applicable regulations, Noridian examined claims submitted

1 by health care providers in the local area, including Group Health, and determined whether to
2 accept or deny claims.

3 36. In coordination with Medicare, Noridian has developed specific criteria for
4 determining whether cataract surgery is warranted. The criteria define the initial pre-operative
5 clinical evaluation of a patient that is necessary to justify cataract surgery for purposes of
6 Medicare coverage. Medicare provides coverage for cataract surgery only when it is reasonable
7 and necessary for the treatment of beneficiaries and only if it is documented that each beneficiary
8 meets all of the following criteria:
9

10 1. The patient has undergone standardized formal measure of his or her
11 visual functional status which suggest it can be improved commensurate the risk
12 of cataract surgery;
13

14 2. The patient has impairment of visual function due to cataract resulting in:

15 a. Decreased ability to carry out activities of daily living;

16 b. Snellen visual acuity of 20/50 or worse, unless:

17 i. The patient is able to carry out activities of daily living
18 with other non-operative means,

19 ii. The operative risk is not commensurate with the potential
20 benefit to the patient, and
21

22 iii. Diabetic retinopathy rather than cataract is the limiting
23 factor of visual function;

24 3. The patient has been educated about the risks and benefits of cataract
25 surgery and has provided informed consent; and
26

4. The patient has undergone an appropriate pre-operative ophthalmologic

1 examination, generally including Snellen acuity and refraction on both
2 eyes with recorded results.

3 37. In addition to these criteria, Noridian and Medicare also require that there be a
4 *maximum* interval of three months between the pre-operative examination and the date
5 of surgery. This interval is intended to allow for observation of significant changes in the
6 patient's health or vision before surgery is performed.
7

8 38. Noridian and Medicare also forbid performing cataract surgery on both eyes on
9 the same day because of the potential for bilateral visual loss. They require that the patient and
10 the physician have sufficient time to assess the results of the first eye surgery to determine both
11 the need and appropriate timing for potential surgery on the second eye. Under
12 Medicare/Noridian regulations, surgery is contraindicated and should not be performed if it will
13 not improve visual function.
14

15 39. At all times relevant to this action, when Defendants sought reimbursement for
16 medical services from Noridian, they were required to complete reimbursement claim forms and
17 submitted them to Noridian. Form CMS-1500, sometimes called the "AMA form", is the basic
18 form prescribed by CMS for Medicare claims. Medicare requires medical providers to accurately
19 identify on the claim form the services they perform by using the codes contained in the American
20 Medical Association's Current Procedural Terminology manual, which are commonly referred to
21 as "CPT codes". The claim forms also require that the diagnosis code accurately identify the
22 medical diagnosis or patient's condition requiring the medical procedure. In addition, the health
23 care provider is required to sign the form and state that "I certify that the services shown on this
24 form were medically indicated and necessary for the health of the patient..."
25
26

40. Forms are submitted electronically or by mail. Before Noridian and other

1 Medicare administrators will accept electronically submitted claims, medical providers must
 2 agree in writing that they will be responsible for the accuracy of the Medicare claims submitted
 3 on their behalf and that all claims submitted under their provider identification numbers would be
 4 accurate, complete and truthful.

5
 6 41. Under traditional Part A and B fee-for-service arrangements, upon receiving a
 7 Medicare claim form, Noridian, applies its own and CMS policies and determines whether the
 8 procedure is documented as medically necessary and whether the claim otherwise qualifies for
 9 payment. Noridian also computes the proper amount of reimbursement for qualified claims.

10 42. Providers rendering services to beneficiaries under MA plans in the region where
 11 Defendants operate typically complete and submit the same or similar forms as those submitted to
 12 Noridian for Part A and B claims. Defendant Group Health Cooperative specifically required its
 13 contracted providers, including GHP physicians, to account for all diagnosis and procedure data
 14 that is required in the CMS-1500 form, advising them that claims made under its MA plans were
 15 "subject to all Medicare billing requirements."
 16

17 **FACTS COMMON TO ALL CLAIMS**

18 **A. Motivation for Profit in the Group Health Cooperative System**

19 43. Despite Group Health's status as a "non-profit organization", its top officers are
 20 highly compensated. For 2008, Group Health reported to the Internal Revenue Service that its
 21 president and CEO Scott Armstrong's compensation exceeded \$1 million. Rick D. Woods,
 22 Group Health's executive vice president and general counsel, reported compensation exceeding
 23 \$500,000. Group Health reported that at least a dozen additional officers earned in excess of
 24 \$250,000 per year during 2008. These officers reportedly also received tens of thousand dollars
 25 in additional benefits during the same year.
 26

1 44. By contrast, the board of trustees who Group Health claims to be “governed by”
 2 earned paltry sums. Trustee chair Jerry F. Campbell was paid only \$11,875 for his services in
 3 2008, and the remainder of the board members were paid less than \$8,000 each.

4 45. Group Health executives, clinic managers, and clinic staff are also paid incentives
 5 and bonuses based on performance and productivity. Assessments of productivity for purposes of
 6 financial incentives depend heavily on “Relative Value Unit” calculations. Relative Value Units
 7 are assigned to each service rendered by the group or clinic. The calculations are described in
 8 detail below.

9
 10 46. In addition to treating patients, Group Health and GHP physicians also commonly
 11 have executive and managerial roles as well. These physicians’ salaries are based in significant
 12 part upon their administrative versus medical functions. Many physician/administrators receive
 13 promotions through the executive ranks resulting in higher compensation based on the
 14 productivity of the physicians operating under their administrative control, measured largely by
 15 Relative Value Unit calculations.

16
 17 **B. Group Health’s Scheme to Increase Relative Value Units and Revenue via**
 18 **False Claims**

19 47. In order to better facilitate orderly and consistent billing and payment of claims for
 20 health care services, between 1985 and 1992 Medicare created and implemented the Resource-
 21 Based Relative Value Scale (RBRVS). One of the central components of this system is the
 22 Relative Value Unit (RVU). RVUs are nonmonetary, numeric values that Medicare has
 23 developed to represent the relative amount of physician time, resources, and expertise needed to
 24 provide various services to patients.

25
 26 48. Medicare bases RVUs on three components: (1) physician work (which takes

1 into account the physician's expertise and time spent in preparation and follow-up
2 documentation of each service performed); (2) practice expense (which accounts for the cost to
3 operate a medical practice); and (3) professional liability insurance expense (which estimates
4 the relative risk of services). The amount of compensation a provider receives from Medicare
5 for a service depends heavily on the RVUs assigned to that service.
6

7 49. Typically, surgical procedures are afforded a high number of RVUs, especially
8 compared with other physician services, such as office visits, examinations, or testing. For
9 example, according to the American Medical Association's 2008 data for the Seattle region, the
10 most commonly performed cataract surgery, extracapsular cataract removal with insertion of
11 intraocular lens prosthesis (CPT code 66984), was worth 17.68 RVUs. By contrast, a
12 comprehensive medical examination and evaluation of an existing patient by an
13 ophthalmologist (CPT code 92014) was worth only 1.91 to 2.84 RVUs. An ophthalmologist
14 performing a cataract surgery would be considered more than six times more productive and
15 profitable while in surgery than while performing necessary pre- or post-operative clinical
16 examinations.
17

18 50. In connection with surgical procedures, health care providers typically also charge
19 a "facility fee". This fee is ostensibly related to costs incurred by the facility where surgeries are
20 performed. According to Medicare and Noridian guidelines, claiming a facility fee in connection
21 with cataract surgery is subject to the same requirements of medical necessity as the surgery itself,
22 including the specific criteria described in detail above.
23

24 51. Due to the requirement that bids for payment reflect an MAO's actual "costs"
25 during the prior year (and the requirement that MAOs submit data reports to CMS for purposes of
26 risk adjustment reflecting actual treatments and diagnoses for its enrolled population), submitting

1 additional reports and claims for surgical procedures potentially results in significantly increased
2 capitated payments, even more so than office visits, examinations, or testing. This potential
3 increase in payments, along with an MAO's relatively fixed costs of providing a given medical
4 service, provides an incentive for rendering high-RVU services more frequently, including
5 inappropriate cataract surgeries.
6

7 52. Historically, Medicare billing for services related to the treatment of cataracts has
8 been subject to widespread abuse by health care providers. The Office of the Inspector General
9 for HHS prepared a March 1986 report following a study of Medicare reimbursement for
10 cataract surgeries in California, New York, Florida, Pennsylvania, Texas and Washington. The
11 report noted that the House Subcommittee on Health and Long Term Care projected that fraud,
12 waste, and abuse related to cataract surgeries cost the taxpayers over \$2 billion in 1985. The
13 Inspector General concluded that, even putting aside medically inappropriate surgeries,
14 unnecessary costs incident to Medicare claims for these surgeries totaled over \$500 million per
15 year. A subsequent report by the Inspector General specifically found that Medicare had spent
16 \$29.4 million in 1988 for medically unnecessary cataract surgeries.
17

18 53. About one decade after this potential for abuse was first identified, Defendants
19 implemented their own plan to increase Medicare revenues from unnecessary cataract surgeries.
20 Beginning in 1994, Defendants' organization saw a dramatic increase in the number of surgeries
21 performed by ophthalmologists. Just within the Central Ophthalmology clinic in Seattle, there
22 was an increase from 738 surgeries in 1993, to 916 surgeries in 1994, 1,048 surgeries in 1995,
23 1,241 surgeries in 1996, and 1,312 surgeries in 1997. After a slight decline in 1998, there were
24 1,365 surgeries in 1999 and 1,499 surgeries in 2000. The data alone demonstrate a doubling of
25 the surgeries performed annually in the Central clinic over the 1994-2000 time frame. At the
26

1 same time, the number of patients seen by Central Ophthalmology actually declined sharply
2 between 1996 and 1999. Even in increasing during 2000, the number still did not match the
3 numbers from the mid-1990's. Again, these data do not include hundreds of additional surgeries
4 being performed during the same period in the separate Eastside Clinic.
5

6 54. After Dr. Lee became Chief of Ophthalmology in January 2006, he undertook
7 various efforts to increase RVUs by increasing the number of inappropriate cataract surgeries.
8 When Dr. Lee first met with Dr. Zempenyi following his promotion, he instructed her to increase
9 the number of RVUs she generated. Given her patient population, this required performing more
10 RVU-heavy cataract surgeries. Dr. Lee also stressed to Dr. Zempenyi and her colleagues the
11 importance of minimizing referrals to qualified external physicians so as to ensure greater RVU
12 production for GHP physicians.
13

14 55. Dr. Lee convened a number of departmental meetings in 2006 and 2007. At each
15 meeting, Dr. Lee ordered the ophthalmologists present to increase RVUs, requiring that they
16 perform more cataract surgeries. Dr. Zempenyi began to suspect that many surgeries were being
17 performed inappropriately in violation of Medicare criteria. Dr. Lee's directives to perform more
18 surgeries were made without regard to the interests of any particular patient and without regard for
19 the medical necessity of surgery.
20

21 56. Ophthalmology department data show the effect these directives and other
22 revenue-spiking demands have had on the number of surgeries performed. During the first
23 quarter of 2006, ophthalmologists performed at least 487 cataract surgeries. Annualized, this
24 quarterly figure corresponds to 1,948 surgeries.
25

26 57. The most recent data available demonstrate a continuing sharp rise in the number
of surgeries despite a patient population that remains level. In 2007, GHP ophthalmologists

1 performed 2,987 (mostly cataract) surgeries. During the first half of 2008, there were 1,744
2 surgeries. Projected at an annual pace, this amounts to 3,488 surgeries, a 17% increase over the
3 prior year.¹

4 58. While demanding that ophthalmologists perform ever increasing numbers of
5 surgeries, Defendants made additional efforts to shift otherwise appropriate services and
6 procedures away from ophthalmologists and toward lesser qualified optometric physicians. This
7 was intended to keep ophthalmologists performing only the lucrative surgical procedures while
8 reducing the total systemic costs of capitated care. This effort also resulted in optometric
9 physicians performing medical services they were not qualified or licensed to perform.

10
11 59. Defendants continued their internal and external efforts to increase RVUs in
12 connection with Eye Care Services. At a recent ophthalmology department meeting, Medical
13 Director Marc Mora, M.D. directed GHP ophthalmologists to increase RVUs by performing more
14 surgeries. Chief Medical Executive Michael Soman, M.D. also promoted the Eye Care Services
15 department's increased RVUs. In fall 2008 Defendants boasted of performing "3,000 cataract
16 surgeries a year".

17
18 60. In connection with Defendants' conduct described in detail above, from at least
19 2002 through the present, Defendants have submitted hundreds if not thousands of claim forms,
20 data reports, and/or other documents containing or reflecting false claims for medically
21 unnecessary and inappropriately documented cataract surgeries. As a result of submitting these
22 false claims and data, Group Health and its affiliates have received substantially enhanced and
23 inflated capitated payments from CMS. Dr. Zempenyi is personally aware of at least 10
24

25
26 ¹ These most recent data may include a small portion of non-cataract surgeries, though the estimated count of total surgeries has been reduced to exclude all procedures performed by certain GHP ophthalmologists known to specialize in non-cataract procedures.

1 individual cases resulting in false claims from within just the past few years.

2 **C. Dr. Zempenyi's History of Recognized Excellence with Group Health**

3 61. For nearly twenty years, Dr. Zempenyi was a dedicated employee of Group Health
4 and GHP. Throughout her tenure, she was committed to professional excellence, appropriate care
5 for her patients, and the institutional integrity of Group Health. During these years, Group Health
6 and its supervisory staff frequently recognized Dr. Zempenyi's dedicated and excellent work.

8 62. Dr. Zempenyi graduated *magna cum laude* from Harvard University in 1979, and
9 received her Doctor of Medicine degree in 1983 from the School of Medicine at the University of
10 California, Los Angeles. In 1984, she completed a Medical Internship at Veteran's
11 Administration Hospital in Sepulveda, California. From 1985 through 1987, she was a Resident
12 in Ophthalmology with the Jules Stein Eye Institute at UCLA.

14 63. Dr. Zempenyi joined Group Health in June 1988. She began working at the
15 Central Ophthalmology clinic in Seattle, and remained there until early 2006.

16 64. Group Health routinely conducted Annual Performance Reviews of its providers,
17 including consultative specialists like Dr. Zempenyi. Dr. Zempenyi had for years received
18 uniformly positive reviews. In fact, in a November 1, 2005 Review, Dr. Zempenyi was found to
19 be a "Excellent Performer" in all of the seven included areas of general performance, including
20 "Professional Competence & Clinical Excellence", "Fulfills Professional Practice Responsibilities
21 in GHP Integrated Practice", "Superior Patient Experience: Patient Relationships", and "Work
22 Ethic/Productivity". In the same Review, then-Chief Chris Diehl, M.D. commented that "she
23 works well to support departmental needs & patient care." No improvements were required based
24 on this 2005 Review, or any of the prior positive Reviews Dr. Zempenyi had received. In
25 September 2006, David Caton, O.D., the Chief of Optometry in the Federal Way clinic, expressed
26

1 his approval for Dr. Zemlenyi's performance in that clinic.

2 65. Dr. Zemlenyi had planned to continue her dedicated service to the Group Health
3 patient base. In fact, in late 2006, Dr. Zemlenyi advised the Defendants that she planned to
4 continue working for Group Health for an additional ten years or more.

5
6 **D. Dr. Zemlenyi's Reporting of Defendants' False Claims; Defendants'
7 Harassment and Constructive Termination of Dr. Zemlenyi.**

8 66. During her tenure with GHP, Dr. Zemlenyi gradually became aware of the
9 remarkable increase over the years in the number of cataract surgeries being performed by the
10 ophthalmology department. Although she was chiefly focused on her own practice and the care of
11 her patients, she began to suspect that some of her colleagues were performing cataract surgeries
12 without adhering to appropriate guidelines and standards.

13 67. In early 2005, Defendants advised the ophthalmology department that they *should*
14 *not* perform an additional pre-operative examination of cataract patients if they had been seen
15 within six months before surgery. Instead Defendants instructed their ophthalmologists to
16 proceed directly into surgery. This instruction was in direct violation of the Medicare/Noridian
17 guidelines requiring a pre-operative examination within three months before surgery. Dr.
18 Zemlenyi expressed her opinion that this longer six month period without pre-operative
19 physician observation was too long, was a violation of Medicare requirements, and a potential
20 danger to patients.
21

22 68. Throughout 2005 and 2006, Dr. Zemlenyi continued to discuss and object to
23 GHP physicians performing cataract surgeries outside Medicare compliance. Despite her reports
24 and objections, Defendants consistently advocated performing surgeries as frequently as possible,
25 and ignored Dr. Zemlenyi's concern that cataract patients be closely observed before operating
26

1 and that alternative forms of treatment be explored.

2 69. Despite her tenure and established policies to the contrary, in April 2006, Dr.
3 Zemplenyi was transferred to the Federal Way clinic. Dr. Zemplenyi had worked in the Central
4 clinic for 18 years and had seniority over all but one of her colleagues in the Eastside clinic.
5 During the summer of 2006, Dr. Zemplenyi repeatedly requested a meeting with her supervisors
6 to discuss the reasons for her transfer to Federal Way. No explanation for the transfer was
7 offered.
8

9 70. After her retaliatory transfer to Federal Way, Dr. Zemplenyi took it upon herself to
10 investigate Defendants' non-compliance with the Medicare/Noridian criteria for cataract surgeries.
11 She reviewed files for several patients who had recently undergone cataract surgeries and learned
12 that Defendants had failed to meet the criteria in those cases. In one case, cataract surgery had
13 been recklessly performed on a patient despite the patient's preexisting blindness in that surgical
14 eye. The surgery had no possibility of restoring vision to the patient and should not have been
15 done. In confidence, Dr. Zemplenyi contacted Group Health's Medicare Compliance Officer,
16 Kathy Harris, about her concerns. Also in confidence, Ms. Harris requested that Dr. Zemplenyi
17 provide some of the patient files in question for Ms. Harris to review. Dr. Zemplenyi did so in
18 August 2006. Ms. Harris later independently determined that in each case she reviewed
19 Defendants had failed to adhere to the Medicare/Noridian criteria. Defendants submitted
20 documents containing or reflecting false claims of medical necessity in connection with these
21 cases.
22
23

24 71. In September 2006, Dr. Lee finally agreed to meet with Dr. Zemplenyi. Dr.
25 Zemplenyi explained that there was a smaller patient population at the Federal Way clinic (and
26 therefore a lesser number of appropriate candidates for surgery). She wanted to work at the

1 Central clinic for one or two days per week. Defendants declined her proposal and continued to
2 demand that she increase her RVUs by doing more surgeries.

3 72. During the September 2006 meeting, Dr. Zempenyi also raised with Dr. Lee her
4 concerns that GHP physicians were performing unnecessary and other cataract surgeries in
5 violation of the Medicare/Noridian criteria for Medicare reimbursement. She explained that she
6 herself felt pressured to perform surgeries that were not indicated or consistent with the criteria.
7

8 73. Following the meeting, Dr. Lee hurried to gather information about the
9 Medicare/Noridian criteria for cataract surgeries. Dr. Lee asked an assistant to collect compliance
10 criteria. During this time, at least one GHP ophthalmologist acknowledged that the Medicare
11 criteria were not being met or documented.

12 74. Following the meeting with Dr. Zempenyi in which she confronted Dr. Lee with
13 Defendants' violations of Medicare/Noridian criteria, Defendants began orchestrating a scheme to
14 discharge Dr. Zempenyi from her employment with GHP.
15

16 75. Dr. Lee quickly determined that Dr. Zempenyi should be subject to a
17 "Performance Development Plan" (PDP). A PDP is widely understood to be the last formal step
18 taken before an employee is subject to termination. Given the fact that Dr. Zempenyi had had no
19 prior discussions with Defendants regarding the need for improving her performance, a PDP in
20 these circumstances was an extreme event not sanctioned by GHP's personnel practices.
21

22 76. It was not until October 2006, during her regular Annual Performance Review,
23 that Dr. Zempenyi was informed that she would be receiving a PDP. The only items mentioned
24 as deficiencies in her performance during the Annual Performance Review were the number of
25 patients she saw and the number of cataract surgeries she performed. Dr. Zempenyi again
26 explained that the relatively small patient population at the Federal Way clinic did not support an

1 increase in necessary and appropriate cataract surgeries. Dr. Lee warned that a PDP would be
2 issued, but advised Dr. Zempenyi that she would have an opportunity to respond to it.

3 77. After the October 2006 Annual Performance Review, the Group Health Medicare
4 compliance officer, Ms. Harris, disclosed to Dr. Zempenyi that Dr. Lee had contacted her
5 inappropriately, demanding that she identify Dr. Zempenyi as the person who had complained
6 about Defendants' false claims. Ms. Harris refused to confirm Dr. Lee's suspicion that Dr.
7 Zempenyi was the ophthalmologist who reported the violations.

8 78. Troubled by Dr. Lee's inappropriate contact and demand for confidential
9 information, Ms. Harris contacted her supervisor and expressed her concern that Dr. Lee would
10 retaliate against Dr. Zempenyi.

11 79. A biennial Medicare compliance audit had been scheduled for fall 2006.
12 Following Dr. Zempenyi's reports, the audit was abruptly postponed. It is unclear whether the
13 audit has yet occurred.

14 80. Meanwhile, months passed since Defendants threatened Dr. Zempenyi with the
15 PDP. Dr. Zempenyi repeatedly inquired about the status of the PDP to no avail. During this
16 period, Defendants had no communications with Dr. Zempenyi about her performance and
17 offered no input about how it should improve.

18 81. During the long delay in providing the PDP, Dr. Zempenyi was subjected to
19 extensive concerted efforts to effectuate her discharge. Defendants gathered any available
20 information that could be used as a pretext to justify adverse employment actions against her. Dr.
21 Lee and other GHP employees acted in concert to devise baseless criticisms of Dr. Zempenyi's
22 performance. During these efforts, for months Defendants continuously drafted and redrafted a
23 PDP.
24
25
26

1 82. Defendants even went so far as to revise long standing Workload Guidelines in the
2 effort to silence and terminate Dr. Zempenyi. New Guidelines were adopted allowing any
3 employee (even with nearly 20 years' tenure) subject to a PDP to be summarily terminated during
4 a "reduction in force".

5 83. Dr. Zempenyi became increasingly aware of Defendants' efforts to silence and
6 discharge her. Dr. Zempenyi was singled out and every facet of her professional practice was
7 examined, whether or not it was germane to the Annual Performance Review. Dr. Zempenyi was
8 subjected to considerable emotional and mental distress, anxiety, and fear for her professional
9 standing, reputation and financial security.

10 84. In July 2007, over nine months after her 2006 Annual Performance Review,
11 Defendants first presented Dr. Zempenyi with the PDP. The PDP raised a host of issues that had
12 never been mentioned before. Defendants never allowed Dr. Zempenyi to have an opportunity to
13 respond to the PDP. Instead, it became a permanent part of her employment file immediately.

14 85. During this time, Ms. Harris in Medicare Compliance retired. The new Group
15 Health compliance officer was aware of Dr. Lee's retaliation, and suggested that Dr. Zempenyi
16 contact the Human Resources Department. After Dr. Zempenyi reported Defendants' harassment
17 and retaliation, Defendants hired an "independent" investigator to look into Dr. Zempenyi's
18 complaint. The investigator was in fact not "independent" but was a former employee of Group
19 Health who maintained close personal and business relationships with Defendants' executive and
20 managerial employees. In performing her investigation, the investigator worked closely with
21 Defendants, while declining to pursue leads and interview witnesses suggested by Dr. Zempenyi.
22 The investigator submitted her report to Defendants in October 2007 and not to Dr. Zempenyi.
23 The report contained numerous self-serving and even self-contradictory findings. Despite the
24
25
26

1 Group Health compliance officers' earlier determinations, this report concluded that Dr.
2 Zempenyi's complaints were insubstantial.

3 86. Even though the PDP was issued with the pretext of allowing Dr. Zempenyi's
4 performance to improve, in reality Defendants had determined that Dr. Zempenyi would be
5 silenced and terminated. Dr. Lee secretly conformed this in an email to another GHP doctor
6 seeking his help in devising an "exit plan" for Dr. Zempenyi.
7

8 87. With no opportunity to respond to the PDP as pretext for her dismissal, Dr.
9 Zempenyi was denied her right to internal appeal and review of Defendants' adverse actions
10 against her. She was subjected to continuing and relentless scrutiny and all manner of gossip and
11 innuendo by her colleagues and supervisors. Because of the pervasive harassment and
12 persecution, Dr. Zempenyi suffered serious emotional and mental distress. In this environment
13 she could no longer appropriately care for GHP patients and she was constructively discharged in
14 November 2007 after nearly 20 years of service.
15

16 **FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION**

17 **Violations of the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)** 18 **Against all Defendants**

19 88. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate herein by reference paragraphs 1-87 above.

20 89. Defendants knowingly presented or caused to be presented to an officer, employee
21 or agent of the United States false or fraudulent claims for payment by the Medicare program, in
22 violation of 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1).
23

24 90. The United States paid such false or fraudulent claims because of the acts of
25 Defendants.
26

1 91. By reason of the acts and conduct of Defendants in violation of 31 U.S.C. §
2 3729(a)(1), the United States has suffered actual damages, including the total amounts paid in
3 response to all such false or fraudulent claims for payment. In addition, the United States is
4 entitled to recover civil money penalties, and other monetary relief as deemed appropriate.
5

6 **SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION**

7 **Violations of the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(2)**
8 **Against all Defendants**

9 92. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate herein by reference paragraphs 1-91 above.

10 93. As set forth above, in connection with the foregoing scheme, Defendants
11 knowingly made, used or caused to be made or used, false records and statements to get false or
12 fraudulent claims paid or approved by the United States, in violation of 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(2).

13 94. The United States paid such false or fraudulent claims because of the acts of
14 Defendants.

15 95. By reason of the acts and conduct of Defendants in violation of 31 U.S.C. §
16 3729(a)(2), the United States has suffered actual damages, including the total amounts paid in
17 response to all such false or fraudulent claims for payment. In addition, the United States is
18 entitled to recover civil money penalties, and other monetary relief as deemed appropriate.
19

20 **THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION**

21 **Violations of the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(3)**
22 **Against all Defendants**

23 96. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate herein by reference paragraphs 1-95 above.

24 97. As set forth above, in connection with the foregoing scheme, Defendants
25 conspired to get false or fraudulent claims paid or approved by the United States, in violation of
26 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(3).

1 104. In order to redress the harms she has suffered as a result of the acts and conduct of
2 Defendants in violation of 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h), Eva Zemplenyi, M.D. is entitled to damages
3 including two times the amount of back pay, interest on back pay, and compensation for any
4 special damage, including emotional distress, and any other damages available by law including
5 litigation costs and reasonable attorneys' fees.
6

7 **FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION**

8 **Common Law Fraud**
9 **Against all Defendants**

10 105. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate herein by reference paragraphs 1-104 above.

11 106. As set forth above, in connection with the foregoing scheme, Defendants
12 submitted documents containing or reflecting false claims of medical necessity for surgical
13 procedures. Defendants knew that their express and implied representations that the surgical
14 procedures were medically necessary and appropriate were false.

15 107. These misrepresentations were material. Defendants' false representations that the
16 medical services were medically necessary and appropriate were prerequisites for payment or
17 reimbursement by Medicare.
18

19 108. Defendants knew that the United States would rely, and intended the United States
20 to rely, on these false representations.

21 109. The United States justifiably relied upon false representations submitted or caused
22 to be submitted by Defendants.
23

24 110. By reason of Defendants' fraud, the United States suffered damages in an amount
25 to be determined at trial.
26

SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION

**Unjust Enrichment
Against all Defendants**

111. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate herein by reference paragraphs 1-110 above.

112. As set forth above, in connection with the foregoing scheme, Defendants received from the United States funds to which they were not entitled, including all amounts paid in response to, or in reliance upon, false or fraudulent claims for surgeries that were inappropriately documented and/or unnecessary.

113. Defendants benefited from those funds. Had the misconduct of Defendants described herein been known to the officers, employees or agents of the United States responsible for adjudicating and evaluating bids for, and adjustments to, Medicare payments, the claims presented and/or caused to be presented by Defendants would not have been paid.

114. Consequently, Defendants received money, directly and indirectly, to which they were not entitled. Defendants have therefore have been unjustly enriched and the attendant circumstances dictate that, in equity and good conscience, the money should be returned to the United States.

SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION

**Wrongful Discharge in Violation of Public Policy
Against all Defendants**

115. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate herein by reference paragraphs 1-114 above.

116. As set forth above, in connection with the foregoing scheme, Defendants conspired to get false or fraudulent claims paid or approved by the United States, in violation of the False Claims Act and common law.

117. Washington State has a clear public policy against the commission of acts which violate federal and state laws, and against conduct which discourages citizens from investigating and reporting such unlawful acts.

118. As set forth above, Eva Zemplynyi, M.D. was threatened, harassed, discriminated against and ultimately discharged by Defendants as a result of her refusing to commit and/or participate in unlawful acts; as a result of her exercising her legal rights and privileges; as a result of engaging in investigative activity which is protected by the False Claims Act; and as a result of her engaging in whistleblowing activity.

119. Discouraging Eva Zemplynyi, M.D. and others from refusing to commit and/or participate in wrongful acts and conduct in violation of the False Claims Act and common law, exercising their legal rights and privileges, engaging in investigative activity which is protected by the False Claims Act, and engaging in protected whistle blowing activity would jeopardize the State's clear public policy against the commission of unlawful acts.

120. Defendants can offer no justification for their threatening, harassing, discriminating against, and discharging Eva Zemlenyi, M.D.

121. In order to redress the harms she has suffered as a result of her wrongful discharge by Defendants, Eva Zemplyeni, M.D. is entitled to damages including back pay, interest on back pay, front pay, and compensation for any special damage, including emotional distress, and any other damages available by law including litigation costs and reasonable attorneys' fees.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs demand and pray that judgment be entered in their favor and against Defendants jointly and severally as follows:

1 1. For money damages in the amount of the United States' damages, payments, other
2 losses, and civil penalties, as are allowable under the False Claims Act, for each false or
3 fraudulent claim, including an award to Dr. Zempenyi as the *qui tam* Plaintiff under 21 U.S.C. §
4 3730, and all costs of this civil action;

5 2. For money damages to redress the harms personally suffered by Eva Zempenyi,
6 M.D., including two times the amount of back pay, interest on back pay, front pay, and
7 compensation for all special damages available by law, including emotional distress, litigation
8 costs, and reasonable attorneys' fees;

9 3. For money damages in the amount which the Defendants obtained from the
10 United States by fraud;

11 4. For money damages in the amount by which the Defendants were unjustly
12 enriched at the expense of the United States;

13 5. For interest, costs, reasonable attorneys' fees, and other expenses; and


14 6. For all such further relief as the Court may deem just and proper.

15
16
17 **Jury Demand**

18 Pursuant to Rule 38 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff hereby demands
19 trial by jury.

20 Respectfully submitted this 25 day of February, 2010.

21 LYBECK MURPHY, LLP

22
23 
24 By: _____
25 Lory R. Lybeck (WSBA #18125)
26 Benjamin R. Justus (WSBA #38855)
 Attorneys for Plaintiffs